

Protecting 'the Shield': Japan and Ballistic Missile Defence in Second Nuclear Age

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Abstract- In the post-Cold War era, the dynamics of nuclear security changed, and it is now known as the Second Nuclear Age. Japan, the only non-nuclear country in East Asia, has always depended on the USA's extended deterrence, including the nuclear umbrella. However, current challenges arising from the proliferation of missile and nuclear technology have raised a question about the seriousness of the USA's commitment. This situation has been further exacerbated by the "rise of China" and the "Nuclear adventurism" of North Korea. To deal with this situation, Japan and the USA believe that relying solely on retaliatory deterrence is insufficient. Hence, Japan has opted for deploying Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD); this option meets the requirement of Japan's pacifist constitution and non-proliferation and disarmament agenda. This paper attempts to examine the relationship between the Second Nuclear Age in East Asia and the deployment of BMD by Japan. It concludes that a nation's security arrangements cannot be negated due to a single incident (Taepodong shock). BMD has a 'defence-offence' nature, which might lead to an arms race in the region. Also, in the Second Nuclear Age, BMD compliments 'the shield', that is, the nuclear umbrella, unlike the First Nuclear Age.

Keywords Ballistic Missile Defence, Japan, East Asia, Nuclear Security, Second Nuclear Age, Deterrence

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1. Introduction

In the current world order, East Asia stands as one of the most delicate and dynamic regions from a security standpoint. The reasons for this are manifold – ideological divisions between communist (China, North Korea, and Russia; not identical but similar) and liberal capitalist (Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea) states; territorial disputes; contentious issues like comfort women, visits to the Yasukuni Shrine by Japanese Prime Minister, and historical interpretations. Moreover, unlike the European Union or ASEAN, the absence of a regional institution means that even minor disputes can potentially escalate into a full-scale war engulfing the entire region.

What further exacerbates the security architecture of this region is – the presence of one-third of total nuclear states - Russia and China (*de jure*), and North Korea (*de facto*). Moreover, Japan does not enjoy friendly relationships with all these countries for the above reasons. Such a 'security imperative' is perfect for any country to go nuclear. However, at the same time, Japan was the only country ever attacked with a nuclear bomb – Hiroshima and Nagasaki on the 6th and 9th of August 1945, respectively – taking nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts as their 'moral responsibility'. These two dilemmas, Security imperatives *v/s* moral responsibility, create a 'nuclear conundrum' for Japan. In the post-war period, Japanese policymakers have been struggling to make a balance between both.

In the first nuclear age (roughly 1945 to 1990), Japan successfully averted this conundrum by 'outsourcing its security' to the USA, including nuclear security. In the post-Cold War period, *i.e.*, the Second-nuclear Age, there was a decay in the credibility of the USA's promises to safeguard its allies when under attack. One of the main reasons for deepening this doubt among many defence experts is the proliferation of ballistic missile technology (having the capabilities to reach the USA's military bases and mainland, though contested) and nuclear weapons with rogue states like North Korea – will the USA be ready to keep Washington at stake to safeguard Tokyo in case of crisis. Japan has deployed BMD systems in consultation and cooperation with the USA to deal with this situation.

This paper attempts to answer the research question – is there a relation between the Second-nuclear age in East Asian theatre and Japan's deployment of BMD systems? Enough literature is available separately on the second nuclear age in East Asia or Japan's BMD system. Still, there is insufficient work to analyse the linkages between the two. There is also a need to document developments in the recent past related to Japan's BMD. It is worth exploring as Japan is one of the few countries with significant advancements in such sophisticated technology.

For the same, the whole paper has been divided into seven parts. The first three parts discuss introduction, literature review and methodology. The fourth part deals with steps adopted by Japan in the First-nuclear Age to avert the nuclear threat. The fifth section discusses the beginning of the second nuclear age in East Asia and the USA's response. The second last section traces the history of BMD developments in strategic planning and later deployments by the Japanese. This is followed by different types of BMD systems deployed by Japan and the rationale behind current developments, followed by the last section in the form of a conclusion.

2. Literature Review

Literature related to the subject being investigated was divided into two parts. The first part deals with Japan's Security, which was further narrowed down to 'nuclear security'. In both cases, available literature can be broadly divided into two categories to support either side of the debate- *Entrapment v/s Abandonment*. The main reason is the 'US-Japan Security alliance', under which the USA has guaranteed its security through 'extended deterrence', including a 'nuclear umbrella'. As literature is the product of time, most literature about the Cold War period falls on the side of 'entrapment'. Japan, a major partner of the USA in East Asia for containment policy, always feared being dragged into a tussle between the two superpowers.

In the post-Cold War era, the subject of this research, Japan, always feared being abandoned by the USA as its relevance had diminished. Hence, she has started to shoulder more responsibilities for her own security. As early as the early 1990s, Berger (1993) stated that the changing security approach of Japan is a response to the changing international system and "... may choose to unsheathe its sword once again" but "... influenced by the preferences that the Japanese people and their leaders have formed over the past forty-five years". Another Japanologist states that Japan has become more assertive in the last decade and has started to neglect many of the principles of the Yoshida doctrine' (Hughes, 2004). Mathur (2004) also accepts Japan's increasing role within the alliance and transforming alliance "from being asymmetrical to a mutually beneficial and reciprocal arrangement". Michishita (2007) thinks that in the post-Cold War period, Japan moved towards being further "active operationally and better prepared legally" regarding security. However, it could not play any major role in shaping world order. He is hopeful about the future "given the change in the domestic political outlook, political capital necessary for redefining Japanese defence policy". Armitage and Nye (2007) also subscribe to the above idea. However, they provide another set of empirical evidence for Japan's willingness to participate actively and contribute abroad. They quote examples like the sending of the SDF to the Indiana Ocean

during Operation Enduring Freedom.

Highlighting the fear of abandonment, Dian (2014) thinks that "... normalisation of Japan's foreign and security policies is not symptomatic of increased Japanese strength but rather signs of malaise and vulnerability". Regarding nuclear security, Japan has become more active by taking on more responsibilities. These steps include expanding the defence budget and deploying missile defence, among many other measures (Sato, 2017). Roehrig (2017) and Smith (2009) have the same opinion: There is a decay in the credibility of the USA's deterrence, including the nuclear umbrella, and hence, Japan is taking various actions to strengthen this decay.

The second part of the literature deals with Japan's missile defence in particular. The available literature talks about two significant 'independent variables' as the motivating factors that affect the 'dependent variable,' i.e., Japan acquiring missile defence. These independent variables are, first, Taepodong Shock, which makes Japan vulnerable to attack from North Korean missiles capable of reaching its mainland, and second, fear of abandonment, pushing Japan to shoulder greater responsibility in alliance with the USA. Most literature finds either first or both responsible for this defensive step taken by Japan. Swaine et al. (2001) have identified Chinese missiles as a threat to Japan and North Korea. At the same time, they also identify the USA's request for Japan's participation in the development of missile defence as a motivating factor from technological and economic angles. Japanese defence personnel take a realist stand, apart from the North Korean threat, and doubt the USA's commitment to testing time, investigating Japan's missile defence capabilities as "deterrence by repulsive action" (Yamamoto, 2007). Another scholarship on this topic gives empirical evidence about the presence of missile defence in Japan's strategic thinking as early as 1987. However, it was "largely aimed to ameliorate tension in bilateral political and economic/trade relations" with the USA (Jimbo, 2008).

Namatame (2012) explores the possibility of missile defence as a 'dual-use technology' and concludes it can lead to an arms race in East Asian theatre. Another Japanese scholar, Takahashi (2012), presents a critical piece of literature; he identifies Taepodong shock as an important turning point, not the only factor. He also presents evidence about how "... [BMD] has transformed the organisation and command and control system of Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF)" and between Japanese SDF and US forces in Japan. Rinehart et al. (2013) and Hoff (2015) present a Western perspective on the topic; both work separately to identify the proliferation of missile technology in North-East and East Asia as a challenge to the USA's security and deterrence. Former work advocates or explores the possibilities of 'multilateral missile defence' with all allies of the US in the region.

Later work identifies that since the threat is common for both the US and Japan, it is beneficial for both countries to share financial and technological burdens under the formula- sharing is caring. Apart from this research work, recent newspaper reports were reviewed to update the data and map recent developments.

3. Methodology

This study employs two qualitative research methods: A. Non-participant observation- in this method, the researcher observes any particular phenomenon objectively to understand different aspects of it to conclude without any biases; B. Deductive approach- here, the observer starts by formulating a hypothesis and testing it with existing knowledge after collecting data. This approach helps in exploring causal relationships between different variables. This study has applied these two approaches to analyse the change and/or continuity in Japan's nuclear-security approach in the second nuclear age. The hypothesis for this paper is- that there is a relationship between the onset of the Second Nuclear Age in East Asia and the deployment of BMD by Japan.

For the same purpose, various primary resources, such as the constitution of Japan (Preamble, Article-9) and its different interpretations, defence whitepapers of Japan, various Joint statements of the Security Consultative Committee and the Guidelines for US-Japan Defence Cooperation, etc., and secondary resources, such as books, research papers, newspaper articles, etc., have been consulted.

4. First Nuclear Age and Japan

For a better understanding of nuclear security, the period after World War II (the first and only incident of an atomic bomb being detonated till today) can be divided into two separate periods, i.e., the 'First Nuclear Age' and the 'Second Nuclear Age'. The first nuclear age – roughly 1945 to 1990 – can be juxtaposed with the Cold War, and most of the characteristics of the First nuclear age were dictated by the dynamics of the Cold War (Rakesh Sood, 2019). One of the defining characteristics of this period was 'Vertical proliferation' between the USA and the USSR. At its peak, both nations combined owned almost 60,000 nuclear warheads, resulting in a bipolar - nuclear world order. From a strategic point of view, the reason behind such a large number of warheads with both states was 'Mutually Assured Destruction' (MAD). This strategy relies on a large number of warheads so that in case of a nuclear exchange, both parties can bring unacceptable damages to each other after surviving the first strike. There always used to be fear of nuclear war due to misunderstanding or miscalculation between two superpowers.

During this period, Japan outsourced its nuclear security to the USA under the 'Yoshida doctrine' policy. In East Asia, Japan was important for the USA to contain

the domino effect of communism. The US-Japan Security Treaty of 1951 allowed the former to station its armed force on the Japanese islands to provide security in case of external threats and to maintain peace in the Far East. This treaty was replaced in 1960 with the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security.

Japan grants, and the United States of America accepts, the right, upon the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace and of this Treaty, to dispose of United States land, air and sea forces in and about Japan. Such forces may be utilised to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East and to the security of Japan against armed attack from without, including assistance given at the express request of the Japanese Government to put down large-scale internal riots and disturbances in Japan, caused through instigation or intervention by an outside power or powers.ⁱⁱ

The USA's deployment of nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula, more than the nuclear umbrella, worked as a "Nuclear spearhead". Japanese policymakers believed in extended deterrence and that the USA had all the reasons to protect Japan in the bipolar nuclear world order. Only in 1975, the USA's President Gerald Ford and Japanese Prime Minister Takeo Miki accepted in a joint statement about 'nuclear-deterrent' as indispensable to the extended deterrence for the security of Japan.ⁱⁱⁱ The nuclear umbrella was a 'secret and verbal' agreement to date.

5.1 Second Nuclear Age and East Asia

In this period (1990—to date), Cold War dynamics are no longer the only deciding factor for the nuclear world order. Another set of challenges dominated concerns about the first nuclear age, and the world required new strategies to deal with them. In this period, nuclear activism is dominated by challenges of 'horizontal proliferation'—more nations acquiring weapons of mass destruction, including non-state actors.

In addition, the theatre for nuclear politics has shifted from East to West and the security community doubts that Western rationality makes sense in these theatres. New entrants like Israel in the Middle East, India and Pakistan in South Asia and North Korea in East Asia have lowered the threshold for the exchange of weapons of mass destruction. This situation has been further exacerbated by the widespread advancement of delivery systems, i.e., Ballistic missiles, for nuclear weapons. In addition to this, safeguarding against the threat of sliding these weapons into the hands of terrorists has become a nightmare. MAD, based on assured second-strike capabilities, was the lynchpin to the nuclear balance between the two superpowers in the first nuclear age. However, in this period, with the new entrants like North Korea and Pakistan, ideas like- tactical nuclear weapons have lowered the

threshold. In the words of Futter (2020):

In the second nuclear age, the greatest risk no longer appears to be from a large-scale conflict between major powers (although this possibility always remains) but instead from regional instability in the Middle East, South or Northeast Asia, or even a non-state actor armed with a nuclear weapon.

When it comes to arms control treaties against the use of nuclear weapons, with the entrants of new players in this age—the multipolar nuclear order—circumstances have become challenging for any prospective treaty. With North Korea's acquisition of n-weapons in 2006, this age began in East Asian theatre, completing horizontal proliferation, leaving room only for vertical proliferation, i.e., an increase in the quantity and quality of n-weapons.

So, to deal with the threat from the cocktail of weapons of mass destruction and Ballistic missile proliferation, mainly with the 'rogue states', BMD appeared to be a calculated and measured antidote. Missile defence prominently appeared in the rubric of the USA's defence structure after the end of the Cold War. Experts and policymakers soon realised that solely 'deterrence' could not be enough to protect the homeland and allies.

5.2 Ballistic Missile Defence and the USA

It means 'hitting a coming bullet with another bullet'. In WW II, the only defence against missiles was the 'malfunction of the missile itself'. In the post-war period, with the advancement of missile technology, defence experts and strategists started to feel the necessity of 'defence against missiles'. Most defence experts initially questioned this idea, and others questioned its efficiency and chances of working in real testing time.

It is interesting to note here that, during the Cold War, the USA first deployed Anti-ballistic missiles in 1968 against China's increasing number of missiles. Later, under the ambit of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT-I), the United States and USSR signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty) on May 26, 1972, limiting each other from deploying nationwide missile defence against Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs). Both parties agreed to deploy a defence system at two sites in their respective country, hence not jeopardising the MAD. Later, the protocol was signed for the same treaty on July 3, 1974, and both parties agreed to half the protected sites, i.e., one in each country. USSR decided to protect its capital, Moscow, and the USA went on to protect Grand Forks, North Dakota –ICBM missile sites for the USA.

By the end of the Cold War, this technology was accepted in the military domain with a high success rate. With further advancements in technologies like radars,

satellites, communications, etc., BMD systems have become more reliable. The earlier idea was blasting off another missile near incoming missiles, leading to destruction, but now, with the advancement, it is possible to hit the incoming missiles directly. During the first nuclear age, deploying the BMD system was perceived as a destabilising factor against the widely accepted currency 'mutually assured destruction', giving the first mover an advantage over another against retaliatory second-strike capability.

In 2001, under the Bush administration, the USA withdrew from the ABM treaty because it did not serve the purpose of the present world order (Handberg, 2015). The reason was the proliferation of missile technology among rogue states like North Korea and Iran. With the further rise of "Nuclear Nationalism", the USA found it does not have a serious threat from ICBMs of rational actors like Russia or China but rather attacks from rogue states to its mainland or allied states challenging its nuclear umbrella (Karp, 2006 & Futter, 2011). Many experts feel they cannot solely rely on 'Nuclear deterrence'. Hence, the USA deployed missile defence on its mainland and overseas to protect its soldiers and allied states, exhibiting its promises to protect allied states.

6. Japan and BMD

Soon after the Cold War, Japan realised that the proliferation of ballistic missiles was no longer limited to pages of defence and strategist planners; it was a reality that needed to be confronted sooner. However, of course, Japan needs to respond under the ambit of its Pacifist constitution, which prohibits Japan from owning weapons for offensive purposes. Hence, BMD falls into the right place, i.e., not being offensive and, at the same, a proper response to new threats emerging from the proliferation of ballistic missiles in East Asia. This led to the signing of different memorandums between Japan and its security provider, the USA.

For the first time in 2004, Japan mentioned BMD in its National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), an important document of Japan's defence planning. In prior NDPGs, when it comes to nuclear security, Japan maintained its old position to "rely on the US nuclear deterrent". Takahashi (2012) states, apart from maintaining the typical stand "reliance" on the USA nuclear umbrella, the 2004 NDPG says:

Japan will respond to ballistic missile attacks by establishing the necessary defence force structure, including deploying ballistic missile defence systems. Against nuclear threats, Japan will adequately respond by missile defence, in addition to relying on US nuclear deterrence.^{iv}

6.1 History of Japan adopting BMD

On January 10th, 1993, North Korea announced its withdrawal from the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), and soon after almost four months, it launched the Nodong Missile – a range Ballistic Missile – on May 29th. This incident made the USA make the first East Asia theatre offer to Japan to join its missile defence program, Theatre Missile Defence (TMD), in the same month. In September of the same year, at the Japan–US Defence Summit, both countries consented to form a forum on BMD. Thus, the TMD Working Group (TMD-WG) existed in December. In April 1995, the Japanese Defence Agency (JDA) established the Office of Ballistic Missile Defence Research (BMDR) for the first time. It commenced a study regarding possible characteristics of BMD architecture, cost estimation, technological suitability and other related issues.

By the mid-1990s, Japan's concern regarding the proliferation of missile technology was re-assured with the 'third Taiwan Strait Crisis' incident. In March 1996, on the eve of the Taiwan presidential election, China launched several short-range ballistic missiles into the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan was about to re-elect Lee Teng-hui as president by direct vote in this election. The Chinese chose the same time for a week-long military exercise and fired four DF-15 missiles. This incident alerted Japan to possibly being dragged into a conflict between the USA and China over Taiwan. Moreover, China might also threaten Japan with its intermediate range of missiles in regional or bilateral disputes, such as over Senkaku island issues, in the future. By this time, China was rapidly adding missiles to its arsenals and had started developing its entire nuclear posture around these nuclear weapons. Another incident which finally shoved the Japanese towards BMD was the 'Taepodong shock'- the launching of the Taepodong-I ballistic missile by North Korea on August 31st, 1998, over Japanese air space into the Pacific Ocean.

Soon after, three months after this incident, in Dec 1998, the US–Japan Cooperative Research Project named Navy Theatre Wide Defence (NTWD) was approved by the Security Council of Japan and Cabinet, later to be recognised as Sea-based Mid-Course Defence (SMD). Japanese government intentionally divided its cooperation with the USA over BMD into three stages: Research, Development and Procurement/deployment. This helped the Japanese to escape constitutionality/ legality due to the pacifist nature of her constitution. In contrast, the US does not differentiate between such different stages. In 1999, Japan, in cooperation with the USA, started researching NTWD, working on the design of four components of the NTWD interceptor missile: infrared homing devices, the kinetic warhead, second-stage propulsion, and the nose cone (Jimbo, 2008). For the same, JDA approved 26.2 billion yen (218.3 million dollars) for the next six

years, i.e., 1999-2005.

It was in 2003 that the Japanese government made an official shift regarding its stand on BMD. In August, JDA requested a BMD-related budget for FY 2004 from the Ministry of Finance (MOF) for the first time. Later, the Japanese Security Committee and the Cabinet Meeting of the Japanese government in December showed a green flag to the introduction of BMD into Japan's Defence Planning, and later, it went on to purchase the same from the USA. Hence, this has shifted Japan's official position from joint study to the development and deployment stage. Following the first nuclear test by North Korea in 2006, the USA started deploying BMD structures at its military bases on the island. Japan followed it in 2009 when it deployed its own BMD structures consisting of Aegis SM-3 and Patriot PAC-3.


6.2 BMD Deployed by Japan

Japan currently has a two-tier BMD system in place. The first or upper tier consists of the Aegis BMD system. This provides umbrella coverage or shields to Japan from any attack of ballistic missiles. The Aegis system is based on ships in the sea nearer to the attacker's (compared to second-tier) territory. It intercepts the incoming missile in mid-course / space before it descends towards the target.

Japan's Aegis BMD currently consists of four Kongo class destroyers: Kongo, Kirishima, Myoko, and Chokai. All can launch Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Block 1A/1B. Another four destroyers are in queue to be deployed: two each under Atago and Maya class Aegis; Atago is being modified to launch SM-3 interceptors.

The second or lower tier consists of the Patriot (surface-to-air missile) BMD system. Warheads must face a second-tier shield if they can penetrate through the first tier. Compared to the upper, this one provides a shield to or covers a relatively smaller area. Patriot BMD is supposed to cover only specific cities or military bases. This BMD system targets the inward projectile's terminal phase, making it less effective. One can say that there is always the danger of only pouring fallouts into that city. In the case of nuclear-tipped warheads, it will still have a negative effect at the targeted site.

Japan has currently deployed the Patriot Advanced Capability -3 (PAC-3) model. Japan has signed a memorandum of understanding with the USA to produce PAC-3 interceptor missiles domestically by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries. It is an advanced version of PAC-1 and PAC-2 produced by the USA; it can counter more targets. Japan has deployed the Patriot BMD system at twenty-three places (as per the Ministry of Defence, Japan's website). Some of these places are the Tokyo metropolitan area, Japan's Ministry of Defence building in Shinjuku, the Southern Island of Kyushu, Air and military bases, etc.



Pic Credit: Ministry of Defence, Japan Missile Defense (mod.go.jp) (Accessed on June 1st, 2023)

6.3 Current Developments

U.S.-Japan joint technological research and development on BMD is ongoing, and both nations are working on advanced version Aegis interceptors, i.e., SM-3 Block IIA. Both countries share equal workloads and financing. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries have been contracted from the Japanese side, and Raytheon from the U.S. government side.

Both countries also conduct joint BMD training exercises to improve wartime response capability. Japan is the only allied country with which the USA has undertaken BMD joint exercises (Hoff, 2015).

Current challenges facing both nations are advancements in missile technologies, such as Hypersonic Vehicles (HGVs) and multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles (MIRVs). These ever-evolving missile technologies demand that BMDs evolve at the same pace to neutralise the threat arising from them.

7. Conclusion

This paper presents enough empirical evidence in support of the hypothesis that there is a link between the Second Nuclear Age in East Asia and Japan's deployment of BMD. A ballistic missile in itself is 'just a carrier', nothing more. Damage is inflicted by the warheads it possesses, and with the miniaturisation of nuclear weapons to be fitted as warheads, North Korea is further improving its technology.

A single event cannot negate a nation's security posture as it gives a parochial picture. Though one cannot neglect 'the thrust' given by such external variables to fast forward, steps need to be taken by a nation to deal with rising challenges with time. In this scenario, '*Taepodong Shock*' did fast forward the required actions to be taken for the deployment of BMD by Japan. At the same time, this incident also helped form necessary public opinion in support of missile defence and interpretation of the constitution in favour of BMD, i.e., being defensive in nature. However, we have enough empirical evidence to support that even before the Taepodong shock, Japanese Defence machinery and policymakers were aware of the threat from the proliferation of ballistic missiles in the neighbourhood, and even after the shock, Japan took its time – seven years - before deciding to deploy BMD.

Deployment of BMD has served the purpose of Japan by discouraging North Korea from going for cheap adventurism by launching very few missiles, as it will get neutralised by Japan itself without involving the USA deterrence. A full-fledged attack will not be in favour of North Korea due to its domestic constraints and the USA's response in retaliation. Hence, Japan's shield, i.e., the nuclear umbrella, will not be tested in a lower threshold exchange of ammunition, and it will provide an extra layer in case of a crisis. It favours the USA also as "BMD ... reinforces the credibility of extended deterrence" (Takahashi, 2012).

In the coming time, Japan can take more radical and advanced steps when it comes to state security under the limitation of Article 9. Such steps include advanced BMD systems like Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD), which have more accurate records and sophisticated technology and are capable of intercepting and destroying a greater number of incoming targets and a greater number of upgraded Aegis destroyers.^v

However, Japan has repeatedly argued that the sole purpose behind deploying its BMD is defensive. However, one cannot deny that such weapons have a 'defensive-offensive' dilemma character. Radars and satellites are used to detect and decide the trajectory of incoming missiles and can also be used for spying. With little tweek and twist of existing technology, launching systems and missiles fired to destroy incoming objects can also be used for attack in war-like situations or pre-emptive strikes. Such perception by neighbouring countries like China and North Korea (both countries have raised such objections in the past) may lead to an arms race in the region and might backfire on Japan.

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- i. It broadly refers to the foreign policy stand taken by Japan in the post-war era. Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida started it in 1952, hence its name. It has three components: security through the alliance of the USA, minimal defence expenditure and militarisation, and importance to domestic growth and recovery.
- ii. Article 1 of the US-Japan Security Treaty was signed on September 8th, 1951. It was signed within a few hours of signing the Treaty of San Francisco/ Treaty of Peace with Japan, which granted Japan equal partner status.
- iii. Japan started pressuring the USA in a major way to accept the nuclear umbrella in public only after the Chinese tested their nuclear weapons. China conducted the first nuclear test in October 1964, the first nuclear-capable missile test in October 1966 and the first hydrogen bomb test in June 1967.
- iv. As mentioned in Takahashi's 2014 Report, before this, Japan released two NDPGs in 1976 and 2004, respectively.
- v. As per an earlier plan, Aegis ashore—a modified version of the radar currently deployed at the ship—was to be established at land near the seashore. However, after the public protested that radars had a negative effect on health, this plan was dropped.

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